Contractual Liability of Physicians and Surgeons by Miller, Arnold J.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1953 Issue 4 
1953 
Contractual Liability of Physicians and Surgeons 
Arnold J. Miller 
Massachusetts Bar Association 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Arnold J. Miller, Contractual Liability of Physicians and Surgeons, 1953 WASH. U. L. Q. 413 (1953). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1953/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
THE CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF PHYSICIANS
AND SURGEONS
ARNOLD J. MILLERt
Alpnost all legal writing on the subject of the liability in dam-
ages 'f physicians and surgeons to their patients has dealt with
malpractice.' Their liability for breach of express contract has
been very little treated. Indeed, this field of study has received
singularly less attention and discussion than its importance war-
rants.
In this article a clear-cut dichotomy is maintained between the
liability of the phyisican or surgeon for breach of express con-
tract, on the one hand, and malpractice, on the other hand. It is
recognized that some persons use malpractice in a generic sense
to connote any action against a physician or surgeon regardless
of its nature or form. With them one cannot quarrel for theirs
is simply a choice of terminology, "de gustibus non disputan-
dum," and is not based on any particular view of the substantive
law underlying the claim. However, the better and almost uni-
versal usage is to restrict "malpractice" solely to cases involving
negligent or unskillful conduct on the part of the physician and
surgeon, and it is so used here.2
BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT
Malpractice in the pertinent legal literature is inextricably
bound up with the idea of breach of implied contract. This was
especially true of the older cases wherein malpractice was re-
garded simply as a form of breach of implied contract. The
physician or surgeon was spoken of as impliedly holding himself
out as possessing the degree of learning, skill and experience
t Member, Massachusetts Bar. The author wishes to express his thanks
to a colleague, Samuel Perman, Esq., for some valuable insights into the
problems dealt with.
1. It should be borne in mind that the subject matter of this article
applies with equal validity to dentists and perhaps to some other practi-
tioners of the healing arts. It is applicable in a somewhat lesser degree
to attorneys. To have dealt with them all would have tended to make the
article somewhat unwieldy.
2. A good working definition is that provided in MALoY, MEDICAL Dic-
TIONARY FOR LAWYERS 318 (1942): "The treatment of a disease by a
physician or surgeon in an unskilful manner, or in a manner contrary
to accepted rules, causing injurious results to the patient."
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ordinarily possessed by the profession in similar localities.3
When he failed to exercise such usual knowledge and skill, he
was regarded as having breached his contractual duty to his
patient.
At the same time, many courts recognized that an essential
element of tort liability, namely negligent conduct, pervaded such
cases and consequently allowed declarations which sounded either
in tort or contract for the same or similar causes of action. 4 In
some cases the two theories were separated in alternative
counts ;5 in others there was only one count with the allegations
sounding interchangeably in negligence or breach of contract.0
In some jurisdictions pleading tended to be a technical and
tricky matter. Thus in Indiana an action for malpractice which
averred that ".... they undertook as surgeons, for the sum of one
hundred dollars paid them by the plaintiff, to attend and care for
for him; that they so negligently.... [etc.]," was held to be an
action in contract,7 but a complaint which failed to make such an
averment was held to be based on tort.8 In Minnesota, however,
it was held that an action against a physician to recover for
negligent and unskillful treatment is based on a breach of con-
3. The authorities are numerous. Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 27
Atl. 1116 (1893); Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131 (1880); Leighton v.
Sargent, 27 N.H. 460 (1853); McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa. 261 (1853);
Wilmot v. Howard, 39 Vt. 447 (1867).
The same language is used extensively in more recent cases also. Dorr
v. Fike, 177 Ark. 907 9 S.W.2d 318 (1928); Roberts v. Parker, 121 Cal.
App. 264, 8 P.2d 908 (1932) ; Kuehnemann v. Boyd, 193 Wis. 588, 214 N.W.
326 (1927).
For a good discussion of the ramifications of this standard of skill, see
Note, 35 MINN. L. Rnv. 186 (1951).
4. Carpenter v. Walker, 170 Ala. 659, 54 So. 60 (1910); Kuhn v.
Brownfield, 34 W. Va. 252 (1890).
5. Mallen v. Boynton, 132 Mass. 443 (1882) (tort, with an alternative
count in contract) ; Hibbard v. Thompson, 109 Mass; 286 (1872) (contract,
with an alternative count in tort).
6. A good example is Sherlag v. Kelley, 200 Mass. 232, 86 N.E. 293(1908), where the declaration in contract ran as follows:
"And the plaintiff says ... the defendant held himself out as possess-ing the knowledge, skill and ability usual among physicians, and that
believing the defendant to have such knowledge, skill and ability, he,
the plaintiff, employed and paid him . . .to give her the proper and
necessary medical care, attention . . .which the defendant promised
and agreed to render; . . .but wholly failed and neglected to do so,
and so unskilfully, negligently and carelessly attended her....
Id. at 233.
7. Staley v. Jameson, 46 Ind. 159 (1874) ; accord, Burns v. Barenfield,
84 Ind. 43 (1882).
8. Reinhardt v. Friederich, 58 Ind. App. 421, 108 N.E. 258 (1915);
Harrod v. Bisson, 48 Ind. App. 549, 93 N.l. 1093 (1911).
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tract to treat plaintiff with ordinary professional skill and is
not an action of tort.9
It did not follow, moreover, that the same court which re-
cognized the overlapping nature of the two approaches to liability
by allowing flexibility in the matter of declarations would extend
this flexibility to substantive matters. Thus in Harriott v. Plimp-
ton,' where the plaintiff, who was engaged to marry M's daugh-
ter, was examined by defendant physician at M's request and was
mistakenly reported by the defendant to have venereal disease,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court set aside a verdict for
the plaintiff on the ground that there was no privity of contract,
even though the plaintiff had brought his action in tort."
Gradually, however, out of the confusion and contradiction
there arose a more reasoned and logical view which harmonized
within itself the two overlapping theories. This view held that
the consensual relation of physician to patient forms the basis
of a duty and it is this duty, when violated by the negligent con-
duct of the physician, which gives rise to tort liability. In Car-
penter v. Walker, 2 Mayfield, J., expressed this reasoning in pre-
cise fashion:
All the allegations as to a contract are mere matters of
inducement and to show the relation between the parties,
and to show that there was a breach of a duty, owing by the
defendant to the plaintiff, based upon or growing out of the
contractual relations between the parties. The gravamen of
the action, in each count, is clearly the breach of this duty
owing by the defendant to the plaintiff, and not a mere
breach of the contract itself....
The action against a physician for malpractice need not
be based upon a contract though it may be, and usually is.
It is sufficient if based upon his legal obligation. The action
for malpractice is essentially in tort, and hence it is im-
material by whom the physician is employed. 13
9. Burke v. Matyland, 149 Minn. 481, 184 N.W. 32 (1921); Finch v.
Bursheim, 122 Minn. 152, 142 N.W. 143 (1913).
10. 166 Mass. 585, 44 N.E. 992 (1896).
11. Another difference might arise where the physician has contributed
his services gratuitously and there is, therefore, no contract of employment.
In an action for malpractice based on negligently caused injuries the
physician has been held liable even though his services were gratuitous.
McNevins v. Lowe, 40 Ill. 209 (1866); see McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa.
261, 269 (1853) (action on the case for malpractice).
12. 170 Ala. 659, 54 So. 60 (1910).
13. Id. at 663, 54 So. at 61; accord, Barnhoff v. Aldridge, 327 Mo. 767,
38 S.W.2d 1029 (1931).
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In more concise form this same view has also been stated:
"Theoretically, it seems to be correct to regard the action as
one tortious in its nature growing out of the breach of duty inci-
dent to a consensual relation.' 14
Today, while courts will display considerable differences with
regard to the nature and form of an action for malpractice, this
view which regards it as essentially tortious has gained much
ground and perhaps has become the majority view.', To the ex-
tent, then, that the tortious explanation of the nature of mal-
practice has gained in acceptance, the line of demarcation be-
tween malpractice and true contractual liability, without the con-
fusion formerly attendant upon imputations of breach of implied
contract, has become more clearly defined.
BREACH OF EXPRESS CONTRACT
The number and variety of claims against physicians and
surgeons involving the breach of express contracts are by no
means insignificant. It seems to be clear law in many jurisdic-
tions that a physician is free to contract as he chooses and will
be held to his promise.16 This has been held to be so even where
the physicians believed at the time that the promise could not be
fulfilled.Y7 Although it is well settled that in the absence of a
special contract to that effect a physician will not be held to war-
rant the success of his treatment, 8 nevertheless, even courts
which are reluctant to do so, will, where the promise to cure is
clear, not refrain from regarding such a contract as valid.-0
14. 41 Am. JuR. Physicians & Surgeons § 120 (1942).
15. ". . . [A] majority, perhaps, of the cases treat the action as one
that is essentially "tortious in its nature, but hold that the tort may be
waived, allowing a suit in assumpsit." Ibid. To the same effect, see LoTT
& GRAY, LAW IN MEDICAL AND DENTAL PRACTICS 12 (1942).
16. Vanhooser v. Berghoff, 90 Mo. 487 (1886); Conklin v. Draper, 229App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y. Supp. 529 (1st Dep't 1930) ; Brooks v. Herd, 144
Wash. 173, 257 Pac. 238 (1927) ; see Wilson v. Blair, 65 Mont. 155, 167, 211
Pac. 289, 293 (1922) (by implication); Kernodle v. Elder, 23 Okla. 743 ,747,
102 Pac. 138, 139 (1909).
Contracts of the "no cure, no pay" type were held valid in Lake v.
Baccus, 59 Ga. App. 656, 2 S.E.2d 121 (1939); Zinze v. Frasca, 133 N.J.L.
68, 42 A.2d 373 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Smith v. Hyde, 19 Vt. 54 (1846).
17. McQuaid v. Michou, 85 N.H. 299, 157 Atl. 881 (1932).
18. Bonnet v. Foote, 47 Colo. 282, 107 Pac. 252 (1910) ; Coombs v. King,
107 Me. 376, 78 Atl. 468 (1910); Champion v. Kieth, 17 Okla. 204, 87
Pac. 845 (1906).
19. In Marty v. Somers, 35 Cal. App. 182, 169 Pac. 411 (1917) an al-
legation of undertaking to cure was held to sound in tort, but an allegation
of warranty of successful treatment was held in Crawford v. Duncan, 61
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With the bringing of an action for breach of express contract,
the scope of liability of the physician is greatly broadened. No
allegation of negligence or carelessness need be made or proved.20
The burden of the plaintiff becomes immeasurably lighter.21 He
no longer has the onerous task of providing expert medical testi-
mony as to the negligence of the defendant, the traditional stum-
bling block in all malpractice suits, unless the suit happens to be
one of those somewhat rare occasions when the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur applies. Once the allegations are held to be sufficient
to support a cause of action for breach of contract, then liability
rests upon the simple determination by the jury whether there
was in fact such a promise made and whether there was a failure
to perform.
From the standpoint of the plaintiff, therefore, the possibility
of making out a case resting on a breach of express contract is
an enchanting one, and one at the same time fraught with much
danger to the physician.22 It requires no great imagination to
visualize the many pitfalls which may lie in wait for the unwary
practitioner. The dividing line between opinion and representa-
tion of fact, e.g., in matters of medical diagnosis, or opinion and
promise, e.g., in matters of treatment, is often very thin and
deceptive. How easily a variation on the theme of, "Don't worry,
Cal. App. 647, 215 Pac. 573 (1923), to state a cause of action for breach
of oral agreement. Cf. Henkel v. Beitsch, 22 Pa. Dist. 895 (1913).
20. In Safian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 260 App. Div. 765, 24 N.Y.S.2d
92 (1st Dep't 1940), the court asserted: "If a doctor makes a contract to
effect a cure and fails to do so, he is liable for breach of contract even
though he uses the highest possible professional skill." Id. at 768, 24
N.Y.S.2d at 95.
21. In Keating v. Perkins, 250 App. Div. 9, 293 N.Y. Supp. 197 (1st
Dep't 1937), the defendant, a dental surgeon, was extracting four teeth
from the plaintiff when a gold inlay became detached from one tooth and
became lodged in plaintiff's throat. The plaintiff sued, alleging a contract
by the dentist "to extract the said teeth and each and every part thereof
from within the plaintiff's body." Id. at 10, 293 N.Y. Supp. at 198. The
breach assigned was the failure to extract the gold filling from his body. On
defendant's motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint as stating no
cause of action. The appellate court reversed on the ground that the de-
fendant, by failing to deny, must be deemed to admit the allegations and
would then be liable on his contract regardless of the degree of care exer-
cised by him. This case is severely criticized in 5 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 156(1938), on the ground, inter alia, that it made for absolute liability and
allowed the plaintiff to escape the difficulty of proof of negligence by a
strained construction of the contract.
22. It has been decided by the courts in New York that a malpractice
insurance policy carried by a physician does not cover him for liability fox
breach of contract. Safian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 260 App. Div. 765, 24
N.Y.S.2d 92 (1st Dep't 1940) (one dissent); see note 20 supra.
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you'll be all right" uttered by the physician or, by the same token,
"I can get blank dollars for you on the basis of those injuries"
uttered by a boastful and inane lawyer, can be converted into a
promise even by the well intentioned but mistaken claimant-a
fortiori by the litigious and fraudulent minded.23 Indeed, it was.
an actual case in the practice of a colleague and the stimulating
discussions which arose thereform that provided the inspiration
for this article. The facts of the case were simple. The claimant,
after unsuccessful treatment of his condition by various physi-
cians, sought the services of the defendant, who had rather a
successful record of treatment of the disease. Unthinkingly and
ill-advisedly this physician wrote on a prescription blank
the words: "Complete cure-$200." The plaintiff thereafter con-
tended that this was a guaranty or promise of cure, whereas the
defendant replied that what he meant by "cure" was "treatment"
and that the words simply signified that the complete course of
treatment was to cost $200,24 that in any case a physician never
cures but only provides the conditions and environment which
enable nature to effect a cure. Fortunately, or unfortunately, as
the case may be, the matter was settled out of court and the
issues never met with judicial determination.
The elusive dividing line between opinion and representation,
of course, is encountered in other branches of the law, particu-
larly in the law of sales, 25 but the physician-patient relationship
presents unusual facets to the problem. Often an important
factor in medical treatment is reassuring the distraught and
23. The facts in McDonald v. Dr. McKnight, Inc., 248 Mass. 43, 142
N.E. 825 (1924), presented an interesting possibility. This was an action
in tort for the negligent extraction of a tooth by an unlicensed employee
of the defendant. As a result of the extraction plaintiff's jaw became in-
fected and he suffered greatly. On the outside of the defendant's office
was a sign saying, "Dr. McKnight, Inc. Nap a minute, painless extraction."
Although there was some mention of contractual relations between the
parties, the reference was apparently to the customary implied obligation
to use proper skill and ability and no specific issue was raised based on
the words of the sign.
24. An admiralty libel was brought by a seaman for maintenance, care
and cure in Muise v. Abbott, 160 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1947), and it was
there stated that "cure" as there used did not meai a positive cure, which
obviously in some cases may be impossible, but care in the sense of neces-
sary medical and nursing attention for a reasonable time. This is the
usual admiralty rule.
25. "It is not easy to draw the line accurately between affirmation of
fact on the one hand and statements of opinion on the other." 1 WILLIsToN,
SALEs § 202 (rev. ed. 1948).
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fearful patient. The winning and maintaining of a patient's
confidence is frequently an instrument of vital therapeutic value.
Physicians are therefore wont to use encouraging expressions
to implant hope and to ease anxiety. A policy by the courts of
strict accountability for such utterances could result in placing
a truly onerous burden on the conscientious and busy practi-
tioner, thereby adversely affecting the expeditious treatment of
many patients. Public policy would not be served by such a
course.
The contrary view is rather forcefully expressed by Allen, J.,
in McQuaid v. Michou,6 in the following words:
Argument is advanced that contracts to cure are against
public policy. The reason suggested is that their enforcement
tends to dissuade a doctor from encouraging his patients and
giving them hope as an important aid to their improvement
or recovery, in the fear that his words will be taken as a
promise. The line between a promise and an opinion is not
so narrow and shadowy that language may not be well
chosen to express one in clear distinction from the other,
and it is a simple matter for a doctor to make it definite
that he guarantees no good results. Moreover, if the promise
were held illegal, a patient ignorant of its illegality would
be misled in placing reliance on it, while if he were aware
of its lack of binding force, his knowledge would tend to
prevent confidence in it and the gain of freedom of state-
ment would be lost in its known irresponsibility.2 7
It is submitted that this reasoning by the New Hampshire
court is subject to several criticisms. It is highly doubtful that
many patients think in terms of legality or illegality with ref-
erence to statements made by a physician at the time, or that
knowledge or ignorance of the binding force of such statements
plays much part in the confidence which the patient reposes in
the physician. Even were it to be known that such statements
were not binding, it is asserted that the majority of patients
would still place reliance on and confidence in them in direct pro-
portion to the positiveness with which the physician assures them
that he can and will help.
But it is to the more important issue of public policy rejected
by the New Hampshire court that the writer of this article
wishes to turn his attention. The practical effect of the court's
26. 85 N. H. 299, 157 AtI. 881 (1932).
27. Id. at 302, 157 AtI. at 883.
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reasoning is to treat a contract between physician and patient
for medical services in the same light as any other commercial
contract. If the law is to deal with a contract of this type as it
would any mercantile contract and to treat the parties as though
dealing at arm's length with each other, should not the physician
have the corresponding rights as well as liabilities? Thus, if the
physician is to be held free to contract and to be liable on his
promise, no matter how foolish or ill-advised, should he not then
be free to provide for his own protection in advance by the simple
expedient, let us say, of having the patient sign a printed form,
in consideration of his agreement to treat him, absolving the
physician of any and all liability whether based on negligence or
purported representation? We are not here dealing with any
question of the physician's taking any undue advantage of the
patient. Of course it is clear that in other respects the relation-
ship between the two is a confidential one, as is the relationship
between attorney and client, and that a court of equity will care-
fully scrutinize any contractual advantage obtained by a physi-
cian from a patient.2 8 We are here talking of a contractual ar-
rangement to be entered into prior to the establishment of the
relationship. Would the courts uphold such a contract absolving
the physician of liability or would they strike it down as being
against public policy?2 9
In the case of Hales v. Raines, 30 which may be unique in that
respect, this question was actually raised anti discussed. In that
case the defendant, a physician and surgeon, was sued for mal-
practice as a result of burns received through X-ray treatment.
The defense introduced was that
"... before applying said rays to plaintiff's hand, defendant
informed plaintiff that the treatment of eczema by the use
of Roentgen or X-rays was a new and imperfectly under-
stood mode of treatment; ... that there was always peril to
the patient under said treatment, which peril it was impos-
28. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1625A (rev. ed. 1937).
29. While at first blush there may seem to be an analogy, the rationale
behind the majority rule that consent to an illegal operation for abortion
thereafter bars recovery in a civil action for damages is quite different.
The woman who consents to an illegal abortion is considered a particeps
criminis and the courts will not lend her their assistance in recovering
damages. The reasoning is clearly not based on any affirmation of the
terms of the contract. See Miller v. Bennett, 190 Va. 162, 56 S.E.2d 217
(1949).
30. 162 Mo. App. 46, 141 S.W. 917 (1911).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1953/iss4/3
CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF PHYSICIANS
sible for a physician to anticipate; that plaintiff told defen-
dant if he (defendant) would treat him with the said rays
he would assume all known and unknown risks incident to
the use of said Roentgen or X-ray, whereupon defendant
applied such treatment. ' '31
To this defense the St. Louis Court of Appeals replied:
Assuming, then, that the matter of assumed risk wasprop-
erly an issue in the case, it may be said that we believe thefull measure of the agreement touching that matter should
be regarded forbidden by the precepts of public policy
alone.
We deem it to be contrary to the precepts of public policy
to declare such agreement valid in the full measure of its
scope, and entail upon plaintiff, as within it, the conse-
quences of defendant's negligence in exposing his hand nine
separate times within one-half inch of the tube; for consent
concerning such matters avails nothing, unless due care and
skill is employed by the physician.32
There is authority, then, as well as reason for declaring that
the relationship of physician to patient is one to which the caveat
emptor type of philosophy is alien. The physician will not be
allowed to absolve himself from responsibility, for his profession
is too far charged with matters of public interest and weal.
Surely there is as high a degree of public policy involved here
as there is, for example, in a statute which renders null and
void, on the declared grounds of its being against public policy,
a clause in a lease designed to exculpate or hold the lessor or
landlord harmless from liability.33
There are, it is true, situations where considerations of public
policy operate to protect only one of the parties to a relationship.
These situations generally arise where developments in the
economic and social life of the community have made one party
31. Id. at 63, 64, 141 S.W. at 922.
32. Id. at 64-66, 141 S.W. at 922, 923. (Italics added.)
33. MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 186 § 15 (Supp. 1952), provides:
Any provision of a lease or other rental agreement relating to real
property whereby a lessee or tenant enters into a covenant, agreement
or contract, by the use of any words whatsoever, the effect of which
is to indemnify the lessor or landlord or hold the lessor or landlord
harmless, or preclude or exonerate the lessor or landlord from any
or all liability to the lessee or tenant, or to any other person, for any
injury, loss, damage or liability arising from any omission, fault,
negligence or ether misconduct of the lessor or landlord on or about
the leased or rented premises or on or about any elevators, stairways,
hallways or other appurtenance used in connection therewith, and not
within the exclusive control of the lessee or tenant, shall be deemed to
be against public policy and void.
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better able to shoulder the burden of liability (for example, as
between employer and employee) or to add it to his costs and
transfer it to the consumef.34 However, it is submitted that such
considerations are not present with respect to the physician and
patient relationship, and the cases are clearly dissimilar.
There are compelling arguments, then, as outlined in the fore-
going, that a strong public policy permeates all aspects of any
contractual arrangement between physician and patients and
operates to lift it out of the field of discourse of ordinary com-
mercial contracts. It operates to prevent the physician from es-
caping his responsibilities to the society he serves, and should
operate, it is here contended, to protect the physician in the pur-
suit of his healing art against strict liability for the consequences
of unguarded utterances and from the fertile 'imaginations of
the fraudulent minded.
The question arises, consequently, as to how this protection
can best be affored. One possibility that might be suggested is
that the courts, or the legislatures more appropriately, strike
down as null and void on the grounds of public policy all actions
of contract based on promises or warranties of cure made by
physicians. It may be questioned, however, whether this method
would best serve the interests of the public or the medical profes-
sion in that, while it would indeed protect the honest and sincere
practitioner, it would at the same time provide a haven of refuge
for the charlatan and the quack and enable them to mulct the
public more efficiently.35 Possibly a better method, although one
not so clear cut in application, would be for the courts to exer-
cise much more circumspection in allowing such cases to go to
the jury. Claims based on promises ambiguous in nature and
susceptible of any reasonable interpretation in favor of the
defendant should, on motion of counsel, be dismissed. Courts
have often reserved to themselves the determination of issues
of fact under the guise of calling them questions of law where
there
34. "The theory underlying the workmen's compensation acts never has
been stated better than in Lloyd George's campaign slogan, 'The cost
of the product should bear the blood of the workman.'" PRossEn, TORTS
519 (1941).
35. In Safian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 260 App. Div. 765, 768, 24 N.Y.S.2d
92, 95 (1st Dep't 1940), Dore, J., argues that to extend malpractice insur-
ance coverage to cases of express contract would serve only to protect
medical charlatans.
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S.. seems to have been a distrust of the jury's ability to an-
swer questions of fact that call for nice discrimination and
an educated mind. The interpretation of written documents
has largely been withdrawn from the jury in this way. The
general rule is that interpretation of a writing is for the
court.36
The same reasoning, it is suggested, might be applied to oral
contracts of physicians as well. A dictum of the court in Haw-
kins v. McGee,'7 states:
It may be conceded, as the defendant contends, that before
the question of the making of a contract should be submitted
to a jury, there is a preliminary question of law for the trial
court to pass upon, i.e. whether the words could possibly
have the meaning imputed to them by the party who founds
his case upon a certain interpretation .3
While this dictum reveals a mild orientation in the correct
direction, the argument is submitted that the courts might well
strike out more boldly in that direction, openly declare actions
of contract based on promises alleged to be made by physicians
generally to be against public policy and refuse to allow them to
go to the jury unless wholly clear and unambiguous.
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
Another difficult aspect of the law with respect to the con-
tractual liability of physicians and surgeons involves the proper
limitation of damages. The measure of damages for breach of
contract is generally expressed as one intended to put the plain-
36. 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 616 (rev. ed. 1936). In 5 U. OF CHI. L.
Rnv. 156, 157 (1938), criticism of Keating v. Perkins, 250 App. Div. 9, 293.
N.Y. Supp. 197 (1st Dep't 1937), was levelled on the ground that even
though the court be correct in assuming that the contract alleged was ad-
mitted by the answer, nevertheless,
.. admission of a contract by failure to deny it submits the construc-
tion of the contract to the court. The rule is well established that in
construing a contract greater regard should be had for the intent of
the parties than for particular words used in its expression.
The argument of the writer of the Note is persuasive in view of the
highly unrealistic phraseology of the allegations in the Keating case, viz.:
"To extract the said teeth and each and every part thereof from within
the plaintiff's body." Id. at 10, 293 N.Y. Supp. at 198.
37. 84 N.H. 114, 146 Atl. 641 (1929).
38. Id. at 116, 146 Atl. at 643. The court correctly speaks of the mean-
ing to be imputed to the words of the parties and does not confuse this
problem with the question of the "intent to contract," as did the defendant.
The defendantargued that no reasonable man would understand that the
words were used with the intention of entering into any contractual re-
lation whatever. However, "intent to contract" is an irrelevant factor
in the law of contracts. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 21 (rev. ed. 1936).
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tiff in as good a position as he would have been in had the defen-
dant kept his contract,39 including also compensation for any
consequences which were reasonably foreseeable and within the
contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was entered
into.4° Traditionally, under this rule, physical pain4' and mental
suffering- are not proper elements of damage. Normally, only
in tort actions or, more pointedly, actions for malpractice, are
pain and suffering or mental anguish allowed as elements of
damage."3 Moreover, a tort rule of damages allows compensa-
tion also for impaired earning capacity,4" loss of time,4 and con-
sequential damages.40
It would seem that a strict adherence to a contract measure
of damages could in many cases lead to anomalous and unsatis-
factory remedies. These are cases where, although the liability
rests on breach of contract, the essential harm done is manifested
in injury and mental suffering. It is suggested that the rationale
behind the contractual measure of damages is based on commer-
cial and mercantile considerations involving factors of antici-
pated profit or loss. Where the plainfiff would have gained an
anticipated profit but for the breach by the defendant of his
contractual obligation, it is readily understood why the defen-
dant should be required to put the plaintiff in as good a position
as he would have been had the promise been kept. This is the
39. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1338 (rev. ed. 1937).
40. RESTATEMENT CONTRACTS § 330 (1932); 1 SEDGWiCK, DADIAGES § 141(9th ed. 1912). This, in essence, is the rule of the famous case of Hadley
v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341 (1854).
41. Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y. Supp. 529 (1st
Dep't 1930), aff'd withouat opinion, 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930);
Monahan v. Devinny, 223 App. Div. 547, 229 N.Y. Supp. 60 (3d Dep't
1928); Frankel v. Wolper, 181 App. Div. 485, 169 N.Y. Supp. 15 (2d Dep't
1918); Frechette v. Ravn, 145 Wis. 589, 130 N.W. 453 (1911).
42. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1340A (rev. ed. 1937). RFSTATEMiENT, CON-
TRACTS § 341 (1932), states:
In actions for breach of contract, damages will not be given as com-
pensation for mental suffering, except where the breach was wanton
or reckless and caused bodily harm and where it was the wanton or
reckless breach of a contract to render a performance of such a char-
acter that the defendant had reason to know when the contract was
made that the breach would cause mental suffering for reasons other
than mere pecuniary loss.
43. Harrod v. Bisson, 48 Ind. App. 549, 93 N.E. 1093 (1911); Coombs
v. King, 107 Me. 376, 78 Atl. 468 (1910); see also note 40 supra.
44. Dorr v. Fike, 177 Ark. 907, 9 S.W.2d 318 (1928).
45. Ibid.
46. Reeves v. Lutz, 179 Mo. App. 61, 162 S.W. 280 (1913) (recovery
allowed for loss of wife's services). A later appeal in Reeves v. Lutz, 191
Mo. App. 550, 177 S.W. 764 (1915), did not discuss this point.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1953/iss4/3
CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF PHYSICIANS
so-called "benefit-of-bargain" rule. However, this rationale can
hardly be said to apply to the aforementioned type of cases.
A few jurisdictions have indeed invoked what amounts to a
tort rule of damages in cases where the action was unquestion-
ably based on breach of contract. These cases involved failure of
the defendant to perform his contract, resulting in needless pain
and suffering to the plaintiff. Thus, in Coffey v. Northwestern
Hosp. Assoc.,4 where there was a breach of contract by defen-
dant to provide hospital services, the court reasoned that the
physical pain and mental anguish suffered might fairly be said
to have been within the contemplation of the parties when the
contract was made. In Galveston, H. and S.A. Ry. Co. v. Rubio,48
the appellant having breached its agreement to provide medical
care and attention, the court held that damages for both mental
and physical suffering were recoverable even though the damages
sought were for breach of contract since the very subject matter
of the contract was the health of the employee.49
Even a court which had expressly approved the contract rule
of damages, including the proposition of suffering not being an
element of damages,5C nevertheless in an action for breach of
contract to cure plaintiff of a disease very ingeniously provided
for such damages, declaring:
Her condition due to the treatment would reflect and show
such suffering, as practically a part of it, and enhance the
difference between it and a condition of cure. While the
excess of spiffering would be in evidence, it would be received
only to show her condition. And such suffering as an inci-
dent of her condition and widening the difference between
her condition and cure, would receive allowance by reason of
its inclusion in such difference.51
47. 96 Ore. 100, 183 Pac. 762 (1919), rehearing denied, 96 Ore. 113,
189 Pac. 407 (1920).
48. 65 S.W. 1126 (Tex. 1901).
49. In Hood v. Moffett, 109 Miss. 757, 69 So. 664 (1915), a physician
who failed to attend a woman during her confinement despite the fact
that his services had been contracted for was held liable for the pain and
suffering resulting therefrom. The court, without discussion, accepted
that there was liability for the physical pain and argued that when physi-
cal pain is an element of damage mental anguish accompanying it is also
an element thereof.
50. McQuai'd v. Michou, 85 N.H. 299, 303, 157 Atl. 881, 883 (1932)(citing with approval the rule in Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146
At. 641 (1929)).
51. McQuaid v. Michou, 85 N.H. 299, 304, 157 Atl. 881, 884 (1932).
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Damages for suffering were thus, at least in some degree,
brought within the terms of the contract measure of damages.
From the foregoing cases it may be seen that some courts will
not, where the fact situation is inappropriate, slavishly follow a
contract rule of damages even where the action is based on an
express contract. It remains to be asked whether a contract rule
of damages would not then be appropriate in a case where the
issue of pain and suffering is not an essential factor. Such a
fact situation might be similar to that presented by Hawkins v.
McGee,52 where the defendant allegedly promised, "I will guar-
antee to make the hand a hundred per cent perfect hand." 3
There the measure of damages was, in keeping with the contract
rule, held to be the difference between the value of a perfect or
good hand as promised and the value of the hand in its present
condition, including any incidental consequences fairly within
the contemplation of the parties when they made their contract."
Upon analysis, however, even in this fact situation the contract
rule of damages appears to be not wholly appropriate. Clearly
the harm done here by the breach resolves itself into: (a) money
and time wasted in medical expenditures and treatments; (b)
mental anguish and disappointment attendant upon the lack of
cure. The remedy offered, it may be seen, is designed to give the
plaintiff "benefit-of-bargain" damages as though the contract
involved an item of commerce or trade. Such a measure of
damages would seem to square neither with the psychological nor
the economic basis of the plaintiff's complaint of harm done and
would mete out an inordinately severe penalty to the physician.
One might well speculate as to what would be the award of
damages under a similar rule where a physician promised to cure
his patient of a disease which later turned out to be incurable
cancer. Ostensibly the jury would be charged that the measure
of damages would be the difference between a healthy patient as
promised and one in the plaintiff's present pathetic condition. It
must be borne in mind that even the highest degree of skill and
care displayed by the defendant in his treatment of the plaintiff
would have no bearing on the ultimate result as long as he failed
to fulfill his promise, nor even, as mentioned previously, would
52. 84 N.H. 114, 146 AtI. 641 (1929).
53. Id. at 115, 146 At. at 643.
54. Id. at 118, 146 AtI. at 644.
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the fact that defendant believed at the time that the condition
was incurable.5 5
Somewhat similar difficulties have arisen with respect to the
proper measure of damages to be applied in an action of deceit.l
A minority of courts, including the federal courts, follow the
"out-of-pocket" rule allowing the plaintiff to receive the differ-
ence between the value of what he has parted with and the value
of what he has received. The majority follow the "loss-of-bar-
gain" rule. As Dean Prosser declares, "Few courts have followed
55. See note 17 supra. Other defenses which the physician might raise
in an effort to avoid liability are: (a) that the contract was void from
the outset due to impossibility of performance, and (b) that the contract
was voidable due to mistake. On neither ground, however, does it appear
that he could escape liability. With reference to argument (a), even if it
were to appear that the impossibility is an objective one and not one due to
the limitations of the individual, which would be a questionable conclusion
in view of the fact that scientists are seeking a cure for cancer and may
one day soon find it, still there is authority which states:
There is . . . no more difficulty in finding a binding contract to per-
form something in fact impossible from the outset, if the facts or
their import are unknown to the parties, than there is in making a
contract in which a promisor takes the risk of supervening impossibil-
ity.
6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1933 (rev. ed. 1938). RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS§ 456, comment c (1932), states:
Parties may bind themselves by contract to perform what is in fact
impossible.. It is only where the promisor has no reason to know of
the facts to which the impossibility is due, and where he does not
agree to bear the risk of their existence that the formation of a con-
tract is prevented.
Neither one of these exculpatory factors would seem to apply to the hypo-
thetical case of the cancer patient. First, the physician had the opportunity
to examine the patient and, therefore, cannot be said to have had no reason
to know of the facts to which impossibility is due. Secondly, when a physi-
cian undertakes to effect a cure, he, of necessity, undertakes to bear the risk
of possible complications, for there is ever present the element of uncer-
tainty in these matters.
In Reid v. Alaska Packing Co., 43 Ore. 429, 73 Pac. 337 (1903), a
promisor was held liable on his contract to sell salmon packed in Alaska
"exactly like Puget Sound fancy Sockeye" even though, as far as was
known, fish of that sort were not found in Alaska. The court indicated that
Alaska still was partly unexplored and the promisor could conceivably im-
port the fish to be packed in Alaska. See also Beacon Tool & Machine Co.
v. National Products Mfg. Co., 252 Mass. 88, 147 N.E. 572 (1925), where
a promisor was held liable on its contract to make a certain machine to
perform certain functions even though the difficulties in the way of the per-
formance of the contract were insuperable.
The hypothetical case might be said to come more appropriately under
the heading of mistake. With reference, then, to argument (b) the law
seems to be well settled that the physician could not avoid liability since
the mistake clearly would be unilateral, and the mistake of only one party
to a contract does not of itself render the transaction voidable. RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS § 503 (1932).
56. For an excellent discussion of this problem see PRossER, TORTS § 90
(1941).
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either rule with entire consistency, and various proposals have
been made to introduce some flexibility into the measure of
damages."'' 5 The case of Selman v. Shirley,s is cited by him with
approval as being a well considered decision likely to be followed
in other jurisdictions. This decision makes provision for a flex-
ible rule of damages depending upon the circumstances, includ-
ing, alternatively, restitution, "out-of-pocket" losses to be
awarded "where the circumstances disclosed by the proof are
so vague as to cast virtually no light upon the value of the prop-
erty had it conformed to the representations,"59 and "loss-of-
bargain" damages.
On the basis of similar reasoning adapted to situations like
that of the Hawkins case, one might well argue that the "out-of-
pocket" measure of damages is the most appropriate remedy
available. Admittedly this would leave the plaintiff uncompen-
sated for mental anguish and disappointment, but this would
generally be true of almost all contract actions and true even of
tort actions where there is no physicial injury. Apparently this
is the actual result of the New York decisions which hold that in
malpractice actions damages are recoverable for personal injur-
ies including pain and suffering, whereas in contract actions da-
mages are restricted to the payments made and to the expendi-
tures for nurses and medicines or other damages that flow
naturally from the failure to perform.60
The burden of all the foregoing, then, suggests that there be
not the one contract rule of damages in cases dealing with the
liability of physicians and surgeons to provide medical treatment
as promised, but a flexible rule. This rule would best adjust the
conflicting interests of all parties, not excluding that of the
general public, by providing: (a) a tort measure of damages for
fact situations where the essential harm lies in needless actual
physical injury, pain and suffering, and (b) an "out-of-pocket"
measure of damages providing compensation for expenses and
loss of time where there is a failure to perform but no physical
harm.61
57. Ibid.
58. 161 Ore. 582, 85 P.2d 384 (1938), aff'd 91 P.2d 312 (Ore. 1939).
59. Id. at 609, 85 P.2d at 394.
60. Colvin v. Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794 (3d Dep't 1949);
see note 41 supra; 2 CARMODY, Nmv YoRK PRACTICE 704 (perm. ed. 1930).61. To provide a deterrent to quacks and charlatans a rule awarding
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THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Another legal distinction of basic importance between actions
for breach of contract and actions for malpractice lies in the
different periods of limitation prescribed by statute. Generally
the various jurisdictions provide a six year statute of limitations
for contracts, whether oral or written, and a two year period for
bodily injuries,3 including injuries due to malpractice. Some
statutes like that of Missouri 3 provide that "all actions.., for
damages for malpractice, error, or mistake shall be brought
within two years from the date of the act of neglect complained
of"; others like that of Massachusetts 4 specify that "actions of
contract or tort for malpractice . . . shall be commenced only
within two years next after the cause of action accrues." 65 Even
where the applicable statute fails specifically to mention actions
of contract, it is nevertheless often stated that the majority rule
is that the limitation period prescribed for acions against physi-
cians, surgeons and dentists for malpractice or negligence caus-
ing personal injuries applies to an action for any such causes
notwithstanding the fact that the complaint therein is in form an
action on contract.66
Again a .caveat must be inserted at this point, for confusion
has crept into the law by reason of the fact that actions for negli-
gent treatment may, at the plaintiff's option, frequently be
brought either ex contractu or ex delicto, as discussed earlier in
this article. It may, therefore, be erroneous to conclude that a
given jurisdiction which follows the majority rule will do so, not
only for actions based on breach of implied contract, but also for
actions based on breach of express contract. Thus in Marty V.
Soers,6'7 an allegation of undertaking to cure was held to sound
in tort and the limitation for malpractice actions was applied,
while in Crawford v. Duncan,6s an allegation of warranty of suc-
punitive damages for mental anguish and suffering in cases of deliberate
misrepresentation might also be adopted along the lines suggested in RE-
STATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 341 (1932). See note 42 supra.
62. See Littel, A Comparison of the Statutes of Limitation, 21 IND.
L.J. 23 (1945), for tables showing the arithmetic means in years for vari-
ous actions.
63. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 516.140 (1949).
64. MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 260 § 4 (1932).
65. (Italics added.)
66. See Note, 74 A.L.R. 1256 (1931).
67. 35 Cal. App. 182, 169 Pac. 411 (1917).
68. 61 Cal. App. 647, 215 Pac. 573 (1923).
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cessful treatment was held to indicate an action for breach of
oral agreement rendering the statute of limitations for malprac-
tice not applicable. In Conklin v. Draper,"9 the first count of a
complaint was held to be based on malpractice and to be barred
by the two year statute of limitations but the second count was
held to be purely contractual and not barred even after the pas-
sage of four years.
Cases have frequently arisen where the negligence of the
physician or surgeon was not uncovered until after the tort or
malpractice period of limitations had tolled. In those numerous
jurisdictions where it is held that the statute begins to run from
the time of the perpetration of the act rather than from the time
of the discovery thereof,70 recovery is barred and great hardship
is occasioned the plaintiff.71 As a result there have been attempts
by some courts to liberalize the harshness of this rule by finding
in a proper case negligent failure by the physician to uncover
the injury during subsequent treatment, or fraudulent conceal-
ment thereof, or a violation of the confidential relation of physi-
cian-patient. 72 It has been suggested that some courts may also
be circumventing the harshness of this rule by applying the long-
er contract period of limitations when the period for malprac-
tice actions would otherwise be indicated. 73 If this be at all true,
then it is a highly questionable method of procedure.
In a case of contractual breach where there is no element of
physical injury and attendant claim for pain and suffering and
therefore no close kinship to a true malpractice action, it may
well be asked whether the contract period of limitations is not
the only correct rule to apply. Query in such a case whether even
a statute such as that of Massachusetts which specifically men-
tions "actions of contract or tort" would be held to require the
69. 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y. Supp. 529 (1st Dep't 1930), aff'd with-
out opinion, 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930).
70. Capucci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653 (1929); see Note, 74
A.L.R. 1318 (1931) (stating the general rule to be that the period begins
to run from the date of the wrongful act and not the date of discovery
thereof).
71. For a discussion of this problem, see Note, 38 ILL. L. REv. 323
(1944); 9 Mo. L. REv. 102 (1944).
72. See Note, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 1222 (1950); see note 71 supra.
73. Note, 16 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 101, 104 (1941), which looks upon the
holding with reference to the second count in Conklin v. Draper, 229 App.
Div. 227, 241 N.Y. Supp. 529 (1st Dep't 1930), as such an attempt.
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application of the shorter period in view of the fact that such
actions are described as actions for "malpractice. '7 4
Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that two possible
arguments may be adduced to bring even such cases within the
purview of the period prescribed for malpractice actions. The
first is the strong tendency of the legislatures as illustrated by
the numerous malpractice statutes to cut down the extent of
liability of physicians and surgeons, whose purpose must be ex-
pected to carry much weight with the courts, and the second is
that contracts to heal and cure do not truly belong to the family
of mercantile agreements which are the raison d'etre of the
longer period of limitations.
THE ELECTION OF REMEDIES AND RES JUDICATA
Pertinent to the distinction between liability for malpractice
and liability for breach of contract is a discussion of the doc-
trines of the election of remedies and of res judicata.75 These
doctrines are normally brought into play where the plaintiff first
seeks to recover against the physician in an action of tort or, less
likely, of contract, and this having proved unsatisfactory for a
variety of possible reasons, thereafter seeks to recover in a
second action based on contract. There is a split of authority
whether the second action may be barred. Courts which have
barred the second action have done so on the grounds of either
one of the above doctrines. Much confusion has existed, however,
with respect to a clear understanding and proper application of
these terms, yet they are clearly distinct.7 6
In Stokes v. Wright,7 7 where judgment had been rendered
against the plaintiff in an action of tort for injuries sustained
due to a negligent operation, the court barred a subsequent ac-
tion for breach of contract based on the operation, declaring:
74. In Forman v. Wolfson, 327 Mass. 341, 98 N.E.2d 615 (1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 888 (1951), plaintiff brought an action in tort by writ
dated March 15, 1944, alleging injury due to negligence in a facial opera-
tion performed apparently a little after March, 1942. There was a verdict
for defendant. In Dec., 1945, plaintiff brought an action for breach of
warranty in connection with the same operation. Held, the second action
was barred by virtue of res judicata. The possibility that the second
action might have been barred by the short statute of limitations for mal-
practice was not raised or considered.
75. For one use of the term "res judicata" see RESTATEMENT, JUDG-
MENTS, Introductory Note 157 et seq. (1942).
76. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 381, comment f (1932).
77. 20 Ga. App. 325, 93 S.E. 27 (1917).
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In the view which we have taken of the question, it is not
so much a matter of res adjudicata, but an election of
remedy .... When he elected to sue in tort and actually
commenced his action for the tort, and prosecuted it to an
adverse decision, his right to sue on the contract was lost.',
The analysis by the court in this case appears to be defective.
Where an action has gone to judgment it becomes erroneous
to speak of the election of remedies. The precise difference be-
tween the two doctrines lies in that very fact, namely that one
pertains to legal consequences before judgment and the other to
legal consequences after judgment79 The Stokes case, then,
properly involved a question of res judicata and not the election
of remedies. As a practical matter, the frequency with which
the doctrine of election may properly be applied to cases of the
type with which we are here concerned is probably severely
limited, for the authorities seem to agree that where a plaintiff
has merely elected a remedy, but not pursued it to judgment,
then the alternative remedy should not be barred to him, unless
followed by a material change of position by the other party in
reliance thereon, provided also that the plaintiff shows reason-
able grounds for making the change of remedy.80 As stated by
Professor Corbin,
[t]his makes the conclusiveness of an "election" depend upon
the existence of facts sufficient to create an "estoppel" ....
The mere bringing of a suit asking one remedy rather than
another practically never affords ground for an estoppel and
is not sufficient reason to deny an application for an alterna-
tive remedy.-'
It would seem clear from the foregoing that almost all the
cases of the type dealt with in this article properly come within
the scope of the doctrine of res judicata, i.e., cases where the
first cause of action went to final judgment. Where judgment
was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, it is said by the authori-
tative writers in the field that his cause of action is "merged" in
the judgment and the judgment is substituted therefore ;82 where
78. Id. at 327, 93 S.E. at 28.
79. RESTATEMENT, JUDGM IENTS § 64, comment a (1942); 5 CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS § 1217 (1951) (maintaining it to be "gross error" to hold the
second action barred by an "election" in such cases).
80. RRSTATEiMIENT, CONTRACTS § 381 (1932).
81. 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1220 (1951).
82. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 381, comment f, § 444 (1932) ; RESTATE-
MENT, JUDGMENTS § 47, § 64, comment a, Introductory Note 157 et seq.(1942).
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judgment favored the defendant, it is said that the issues to the
extent that they were or ought to have been finally determined
have been "discharged by adjudication" and further litigation
thereon is barred.8 3
Decisions wherein the defense of res judicata has been raised
and decided appear to be hopelessly irreconcilable. The New
York cases hold that a cause of action for malpractice which
has been previously dismissed with judgment awarded to defen-
dant is no bar to a present action on a contract. It is stated that
the two causes of action are not the same; they are dissimilar as
to theory, proof, and damages recoverable."4 The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, on the other hand, has stated upon
similar facts that the second cause of action is barred, declaring:
"there is present every element essential for invoking the doc-
trine of res judicata-identity of cause of action and issues, the
same parties, and judgment on the merits by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction."',
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in McQuaid v. Michou,5
reached the same conclusion as the New York court, spelling
out its reasoning in a little more detail. The court argued that
the doctrine of res judicata was not applicable since the issue of
liability for malpractice in the prior case involved negligence and
was different from the issue to effect a cure. The failure to prove
liability for malpractice did not disprove the promise to cure
nor was the promise to cure any more than a collateral matter
in the prior case.8 7
Perhaps the last word has not been said on the matter, how-
ever, and the courts may really not be so irreconcilable as they
now appear. It must be remembered that the New York court,
despite its language upholding the dissimilarity of the two ac-
tions, has, in connection with the problem of applying the proper
statute of limitations, decided more than once that an action
may in reality be one for malpractice despite its superficial guise
83. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 449 (1932), RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS§ 48 (1942).
84. Colin v. Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794 (3d Dep't 1949).
85. Forman v. Wolfson, 327 Mass. 341, 343, 98 N.E.2d 615, 616 (1951),
,cert. denied, 342 U.S. 888 (1951); see note 74 supra.
86. 85 N.H. 299, 157 Atl. 881 (1932).
87. Id. at 300, 157 Atl. at 882.
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as an action on the contract.8 So too, perhaps, in a case where
the allegations indicate the making of an actual contract, rather
than repeat the usual formalized language designed to meet the
requirements of an action on the contract, the Massachusetts
court may unbend from its present unyielding attitude.
On the basis of the decisions as they now stand, however, it
would appear that the arguments of the New York and the New
Hampshire courts are more compelling in their logic and that
judgment for the defendant in a prior action for malpractice
based on negligent conduct should not be a bar to a subsequent
action by the plaintiff based on the breach of an express con-
tract.
CONCLUSION
It is well settled that a physician or surgeon may be liable for
breach of express contract. With the statement of that legal
proposition, however, no inkling is given of the ramifications of
a difficult problem. Analysis shows that contracts made by physi-
cians and surgeons to provide a cure or to provide specific medi-
cal treatment differ sharply from ordinary commercial contracts
in two broad respects: (a) they are impressed with a strong
public policy, and (b) their fact situations are utterly lacking
in the profit motive encountered in commercial transactions.
Distinction (a) finds its main implications in the area of the
imposition of liability. In an action on the contract for failure
to perform as promised, the plaintiff has a much simpler task
of proof than in an action for malpractice. The invitation is
there to construe unguarded utterances of the attending physi-
cian as allegations of promise. The dangers inherent to the phy-
sician, whose malpractice insurance would then afford no protec-
tion, are pointed out, and the argument is made that public policy
not only requires the protection of the public in its dealings with
medical practitioners but also requires the protection of the
practitioner in the pursuit of his highly essential profession.
This protection, it is suggested, can best be afforded not by
legislatures making all contracts to cure void on the ground of
public policy, as this would enable quacks and charlatans to
operate in safety, but by the courts declaring unequivocally that
88. Horowitz v. Bogart, 218 App. Div. 158, 217 N.Y. Supp. 881 (1st
Dep't 1926); Frankel v. Wolper, 181 App. Div. 485, 169 N.Y. Supp. 15(2d Dep't 1918), aff'd without opinion, 228 N.Y. 582, 127 N.E. 913 (1920).
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such contracts are not ordinary commercial contracts, but are
charged with a public policy, and thereafter arrogating to them-
selves as preliminary questions of law the interpretation of the
words of the alleged contract, as they now do for written instru-
ments. If the words used can, upon any reasonable interpreta-
tion, be those of opinion rather than promise, then the case
should not be allowed to go to the jury.
Distinction (b) finds its main implications in the field of the
proper measure of damages to be applied. The fact situation in
these cases can generally be resolved into two categories: (1)
where physical injury, pain and suffering resulted from the phy-
sician's failing to fulfill his contract, and (2) where no such
injury resulted but the plaintiff did undergo medical expendi-
tures, possible loss of time and earnings, and grievous disap-
pointment at the lack of cure or successful treatment. In neither
category does a contract measure of damages based on a "bene-
fit-of-bargain" rule, and designed to put the promisee in as good
a position as he would have been in had the promisor kept his
contract, offer a satisfactory remedy. With reference to cate-
gory (1), such a contract measure of damages would generally
deny plaintiff recovery for injury, pain and suffering, and with
reference to category (2), it would tend to award the plaintiff
far more than he ever anticipated and to penalize the physician
severely. It is therefore suggested that a flexible measure of
damages be adopted, similar to the one developing in the law of
deceit, awarding the plaintiff what is substantially a tort measure
of damages for situations in category (1) and "out-of-pocket"
losses, but not damages for grievous disappointment and dis-
tress, for situations in category (2). It is noted that such "out-
of-pocket" losses are substantially what is being awarded by the
New York courts in cases of breach of contract against physi-
cians.
Further ramifications of the problem are found in deciding the
correct statute of limitations to be applied to breaches of express
contract. The issue is bedeviled by confusion as to what is con-
noted by the term "action of contract." The history of mal-
practice actions shows the theories of tort and breach of implied
contract to be inextricably bound up together. The majority of
courts allow actions to be brought interchangeably ex contractu
or ex delicto for causes of negligent conduct by a physician. The
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gravamen or gist of such actions, it became recognized, lay in
tortious misconduct. Nevertheless, the courts continued to re-
cognize the designation of such actions as actions of contract, if
the plaintiff so chose to bring them. For such "actions of con-
tract" the various jurisdictions usually apply the short statute of
limitations indicated for malpractice or bodily injuries, rather
than the longer statute of limitations for contracts. In some
cases they follow the general rule to that effect; in other cases the
applicable statute expressly mentions actions of contract for
malpractice. When, however, the cause of action is based on
breach of express contract, the issue becomes clouded over. A few
jurisdictions have distinguished between the two situations and
have invoked the longer period of limitations for contracts based
on express promises. It remains to be seen whether the other
jurisdictions will follow without critical analysis generalized
statements about "actions of contract."
Finally, there is the problem as to whether a judgment for the
defendant in an action for malpractice bars a subsequent action
on an express contract. Here the doctrine of res judicata comes
into play, not that of the election of remedies as is sometimes
improperly stated. Again confusion arises due to the failure to
distinguish properly between actions based on implied contract
and actions based on express contract. Although the cases appear
to be irreconcilably in conflict, some barring the subsequent ac-
tion and others allowing it, the suspicion is entertained that
where the allegations in an appropriate case indicate the making
of an actual contract rather than repeat the usual formalized lan-
guage designed to meet the requirements of an action on the
contract, even courts which have hitherto barred the subsequent
action will reconsider their position, and thus, indeed, adopt the
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